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The rapid rise in public and private pharmaceutical expenditures during the 1980s fueled debate about appropriate policies to moderate this growth without threatening the publics health (Soumerai and RossDegnan 1990) . Through Medicaid and pharmaceutical assistance pro grams for the near-poor elderly, states have been the largest public insurers of prescription drugs for low-income, elderly, and disabled per sons (Soumerai and Ross-Degnan 1990) . Although they comprise 7.8 percent o f total health expenditures in Medicaid, at a cost of $7.97 billion, in 1 99 3 , prescription drugs have been one o f the most rapidly increasing costs (Health Care Financing Administration 1 9 8 0 -9 3 ; Schondelmeyer and Thomas 1990) . This is due primarily to rapid price in flation, as indicated by an annual rise of 11.6 percent in the Consumer Price Index for Drugs between 1980 and 1993 (Bureau o f Labor Sta tistics 1 9 8 0 -9 3 ).
W e focused our analyses on two types o f patient cost-sharing require ments, prescription reimbursement limits and copayments, policies for which the scientific literature has produced good empirical evidence regarding effects on utilization, costs, quality, and outcomes of care.
This strong evidence provides the opportunity to examine the role of research information in the policy development process. Our recent comprehensive and critical review o f the literature (Soumerai et al. 1993) on the effects o f these policies led us to these conclusions:
• Several adequately controlled studies indicate that copayments as low as one dollar per prescription in Medicaid have resulted in declines of 5 to 10 percent in overall drug utilization. Some evi dence exists that even modest cost sharing can reduce the use of both essential agents and less essential drugs. However, no defini tive evidence exists that typical copayments in Medicaid adversely affect health status or raise other costs.
• Prescription lim its (caps) have had a sizable impact on the use of both "essential" medications (e.g., insulin and furosemide) and ineffective drugs. W ith a three drug per patient monthly cap, prescriptions filled by chronically ill elderly and disabled recipi ents decreased by 4 8 percent overall; these reductions were mini mally offset by out-of-pocket purchases.
• Prescription lim its (e.g., three-drug caps) have been found to in crease total costs and nursing-home admissions significantly among elderly persons with chronic illnesses and to increase adverse pa tient outcomes, requiring emergency mental health services and partial hospitalizations among schizophrenic patients (Soumerai et al. 19 9 1 , 1994) . These studies o f just two identified high-risk populations indicate that the increased costs o f nursing-home ad missions and mental health services resulting from a three-drug cap greatly exceed the statewide drug savings. The data strongly suggest that state and federal drug benefit programs should avoid imposing arbitrary prescription lim its as cost-containment strate gies because they raise total health care costs and harm chronically ill patients.
Copayments and prescription caps are prevalent in state Medicaid programs. A t the tim e o f our survey, 21 states required copayments of between 50 cents and three dollars, and 11 did not provide drug ben efits beyond a predetermined prescription cap (commonly three to six prescriptions per patient per month). Although caps on services may be applied to all recipient populations, federal law prohibits the imposition of cost sharing on individuals under age 18 (or 21 by state option); pregnancy-related services; certain institutionalized individuals; emer gency services; family planning services; and categorically needy H M O enrollees (N ational Pharmaceutical Council 1 9 8 1 -9 4 ).
Little has been published about the determinants o f cost-containment policies at the state level. However, previous work on the barriers to adoption o f research results by health and social service organizations (Solomon and Shortell 1981 ; Brown 1 9 8 7 ) is relevant to our research questions concerning the use o f scientific data in Medicaid decision making. The literature identifies some commonly cited barriers to re search transfer:
1. lack o f relevance o f information to the primary goals of service providers (Averch 197 5 ; Cox 1978) 2. lack o f timeliness o f data when decision makers could use them (Banta and Bauman 1976; Weiss 1977 Weiss , 1978 3. lack o f effective communication to decision makers because messages are not delivered in readily interpretable formats and language,
are not targeted to leading decision makers, or lack credibility (Soumerai and Avorn 1990) 4. lack o f organization and resources to implement research findings (Brown 1 9 8 7 )
Related organizational and political barriers in complex or bureau cratic organizations include: lack of independent authority or power of policy makers to implement desired changes (W illiam s 197 1 ); lack of readiness to accept change (Kiresuk, Larsen, and Lund 1 9 8 1 ); instability of staff; and little institutional support for the use o f research informa tion (Solomon and Shortell 1981) .
W e hypothesized that many o f these factors would also be identified as important barriers to rational drug cost-containm ent policy making, especially those related to the timeliness of information and the orga nizational and political constraints on Medicaid agencies. By using openended qualitative methods, we also hoped to highlight important but previously unidentified factors influencing the adoption of costcontainm ent policies. Increased understanding o f how Medicaid agen cies reach specific policy decisions could ultimately help to identify strategies to improve the policy development process. The dissemina tion of evidence-based cost-containment policies will increase the like lihood o f cost savings while minimizing patient harm.
M ethods
W e conducted in-depth, semistructured telephone interviews with key informants in 4 8 states (response rate = 96 percent) to elicit open-ended responses concerning their perception o f critical problems, issues, and constraints preceding a pharmaceutical policy change that had been instituted in the last several years. We identified specific instances of change in cost-containm ent policies through a review of annual reports o f Medicaid pharmaceutical programs produced by the National Phar maceutical Council (1 9 8 1 -94). For this study, we report the results of interviews conducted with 28 informants from 19 o f the 22 states that changed cost-sharing policies between 1986 and 1993, including pre scription reimbursement lim its (n = 11) and copayments (n = 8). We investigated key policy proponents; their rationales for acting, antici pated positive and negative effects, and reservations about the policy change; their attem pts to evaluate the im pact o f the policy; and the ways in which the pharmaceutical industry, the federal government, and aca demic researchers influenced the process.
During 1993 and 1994 we interviewed key informants in 11 states that had recently instituted, tightened, relaxed, abolished, or proposed to abolish prescription reimbursement lim its ( 
R esults
In this section, we present our findings on underlying structural issues facing state Medicaid policy makers, the objectives and perceived effects o f policy changes, and the influence on decision making o f the phar maceutical industry, federal agencies, and academic researchers. The Budget Office claimed that there was no study which showed that removing drug coverage would harm recipients or have cost effects in other ways. . . . The anticipated 1993 Medicaid drug budget was $324 million, which was the amount needed to balance the state budget. Eliminate the Medicaid drug program, and the entire state budget would balance.. . . Medicaid only had a week to make a case to keep drug benefits. . . . This case study is revisited below in the section on influences of the pharmaceutical industry, federal agencies, and academic researchers. The Medicaid program in a large Southern state recently faced even more unreasonable demands for rapid decisions when the legislature s budget staff suddenly announced a fiscal need to tighten the states monthly prescription lim it from six to three per recipient. The dem onstrated hazards o f such an approach caused the Medicaid staff to resist this change. Drug program staff were given only three hours to develop alternative cost-cutting policies that would achieve the same savings.
S tru ctu ra l a n d P o litical Issues
According to one respondent, the staff attempted to wield "scalpels instead of a m eat-axe," and ultim ately succeeded by changing copay ment levels, in stitutin g drug price rebates, and establishing drug utilization review and prior authorization procedures, all o f which ne cessitated rapid staffing increases.
Lack o f Political Power. One major structural constraint reported by
Medicaid administrators was their lack of authority to implement the most rational policies. Medicaid directors or staff were identified as key proponents in only two o f seven proposed or successful attempts to tighten prescription caps, and in half o f decisions to institute or raise copayments. Although Medicaid program staff were often the most aware of specific risks and benefits of alternative policies (based on their experience with Medicaid patients and advocates and their familiarity with published studies), they were often constrained by political forces.
In the words o f one Medicaid staff member:
In public hearings, the Medicaid drug program administrator cannot dis approve publicly of anything that will save money even if it doesn't make sense, because we have a Governor bent on cutting government. Its a caustic thing with the legislature. The previous Bureau of Medical Services director was fired for not dancing with the Governor. . . .
In a Southern state a no-new-tax pledge by the governor defeated a legislative proposal to eliminate a three-drug cap despite evidence that such a change would be budget neutral. Medicaid staff often recognize that medications represent essential medical services, but they lack hard, persuasive, and relevant data to convince either legislative committees or the governor's office that drug benefits are cost effective, especially for chronically ill and disabled individuals whose functional independence in the community often depends on access to pharmaceuticals.
Another barrier to cost-effective policy making is the compartmen talized budget and accounting process in state government. Important economic benefits o f access to essential medications are sometimes not apparent because they occur as savings in other nondrug health services.
For example, although Medicaid drug program staff m ight be aware that reimbursement limits can raise hospital and nursing-home utili zation, they still accept the constraints because they consider their drug program budget in isolation.
Lack o f Infrastructure for Policy Formulation and Evaluation. Many
Medicaid programs lack staff with the training, experience, and analytic skills necessary to select optimal policies. Respondents were often un abashedly frank when describing the subjective nature of the analytic processes leading to policy. 
Objectives a n d Perceived Effects
The reported rationale and expected effects of cost-containment policies often reflect dominant societal and governmental perceptions about Med icaid recipients and have as their major themes reducing unnecessary uti lization; increasing patient responsibility; and minimizing negative policy effects by selecting the "lesser evil" among competing alternatives.
Policy Objectives. Cost cutting was cited as the predominant objec tive in all 12 states that instituted or tightened caps or copayment pol icies. In many cases respondents could cite expected drug cost savings, based on historical drug utilization data (but not including increased costs in other sectors). O ther positive effects reported for increased co payment levels were keeping pace with rising drug prices and main taining consistency with private insurers.
Respondents in five states that reduced benefits reported choosing policies in order to moderate the negative impact o f cutbacks. Accord ing to one drug program manager in a Southern state: "W e had to do something, and this [raising copayments] was the lesser evil." In a
Northern state, Medicaid program staff were happy to succeed in insti tuting a mild copayment policy instead o f the governor's proposal, a much more restrictive two-prescription per month cap: "There was an uproar by patient advocates and the advisory com m ittee when they found out that the state was trying to get a two-prescription lim it."
The belief that increased patient cost sharing would inject greater patient responsibility and rationality into the drug utilization process was another important theme. Three o f seven respondents felt that co payments would increase physician and patient awareness o f costs and involvement in their care and reduce inappropriate use o f medication.
According to a respondent from a Northern state that was instituting a higher copayment for single-source drugs, the policy "would cause recipients-who, in fact, pay the copayment-to ask their physician to
give them a generic, and get involved in their own health care." Despite data suggesting that copayments tend to reduce both appropriate and inappropriate therapy (Lohr et al. 1986 ), another respondent reiterated:
"The copay should help reduce unnecessary prescriptions . . . and make patients think about drugs." Several respondents from Southern states also expressed the opinion that copayments deter recipients from fraudu lently obtaining drugs for other individuals. Respondents in seven states that relaxed their caps and copayment policies (or prevented their enactment) expected several positive effects:
reduced inequities in access; increased access to essential medications; reduced administrative difficulties in exempting essential drugs from a cap policy (e.g., the highly effective, but expensive, antipsychotic agent,
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clozapine, requires weekly prescriptions); cutting down on drug wast age or abuse associated with larger prescriptions induced by the policies;
and reduced hospital and nursing-home admissions.
U nintended Effects
W hen asked whether tightened prescription caps produced negative effects, four o f five respondents mentioned possible decreases in access to needed medications, in patient care-seeking, and in quality of care. Advocacy groups, and some physicians, were the principal voices of opposition to increasingly restrictive policies. (However, physicians as a rule did not try to influence policy decisions.)
H alf the respondents in states instituting or increasing copayments cited possible negative effects: reduced access to needed medications when there were differential copayment levels for single-source versus multisource products; cost transfers to patients who can least afford it; failed drug treatm ent; visits to emergency rooms to obtain medications;
and concentrated adverse effects for individuals with multiple and/or chronic illnesses.
Barriers to Evaluation. Although many respondents were aware (from their own experience, professional networks, or published data) that prescription caps and copayments m ight reduce quality of care, none of the Medicaid programs evaluated the potentially negative impact of these policy changes. In two o f seven states that increased copayments, Medicaid staff informally analyzed attributed savings. Three of 11 states conducted uncontrolled analyses o f yearly shifts in drug expenditures following changes in prescription caps, but they did not evaluate possible offsetting increases in other health expenditures or declines in quality of care. Lack o f expertise and negative perceptions about evaluation discour aged its use. The statements o f several respondents suggest considerable naivete regarding the appropriate use o f evidence and the causal rela tions among policy changes, health care utilization, costs, and patient outcomes. For example, based on aggregate counts o f visits, one Med icaid staff member in a state that implemented a cap concluded, "There was some concern that people . . . m ight avoid seeking care. This seems not to have occurred."
Based on similar inappropriate analyses, drug program managers in two Southern states that were instituting a higher copayment level stated:
Respondent 1 : In the 1970s, the co-pay caused prescription volume to drop by 20 percent, but it came back after a few months. Respondent 2 : You can look at current utilization and tell that cost-sharing has not put people in the hospital or caused any precipitous reduction in drug use.
O f course, seat-of-the-pants analyses do not adjust for prepolicy trends or coincident policy changes. In addition, significant harmful effects on vulnerable subgroups are unlikely to be seen in gross utilization data.
Whereas some respondents were aware o f the need for evaluation, they simply lacked the necessary resources. One drug program manager in a state that increased its copayment level reports: "W e didn't have the time or the staff to evaluate the effects o f the policy. . . . Sorry, we're flying blind. I can't tell you o f any reports at all." Indifference toward evaluation is readily apparent in the comments o f a Medicaid staff member in a state that recently lowered its monthly cap from four to three prescriptions: "Either way you go, it [evaluation] doesn't matter at an administrative level."
Influence o f the 'Pharm aceutical Industry, Federal Agencies, a n d Academ ic Researchers
Given the limited capacity o f state Medicaid programs to analyze the potential and actual consequences o f various policy alternatives, it is important to assess whether industry, the federal government, or aca demic experts have provided sufficient technical assistance and critical scientific input. W e asked all respondents to rate the degree to which these three sources o f information and influence contributed to decisions to institute or modify their cost-sharing policies (table 3) and to de scribe how this input was provided.
Industry. The pharmaceutical industry was seen as actively involved about one-third o f the tim e, particularly in policy decisions that affected prescribing o f single-source agents (e.g., differential copayment levels 24 HCFA could certify the program at that level. In response, the cap was relaxed to three prescriptions per month. In the Midwestern state whose governor wished to elim inate the entire drug program, Medicaid staff held extensive discussions with HCFA to determine the extent of state flexibility in restricting reimbursement for specific populations (e.g., children, pregnant women, and nursing-home residents). In general, however, federal agencies were not described as initiating technical as sistance, volunteering specific data, or offering advice on policy alter natives unless they were asked. In a second case, the pharmaceutical industry and the state medical association used published university research on the New Hampshire cap to advocate elimination o f a prescription cap in a Southern state on the grounds that doing so would reduce hospitalization and nursinghome admissions. As in the first case, economic arguments dominated the list of reasons for expanding drug coverage. In this instance, how ever, relevant research findings were promoted by the drug industry. "There was simply no tim e to get input from these people. We did it on an a d hoc basis as thoroughly as we possibly could, but we needed to keep the program running." Another constraint on academic policy input is the fact that Medicaid staff often are insufficiently trained in policy analysis, research, and evaluation. A respondent in a state that instituted a differential copay m ent described the situation thus:
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T A B L E 3 In p ut Provided by Industry, G overnm ent, and A cadem ia on P olicy
Medicaid staff will gather information from some publications of . .. the Public Welfare Association. However, they usually are not familiar with academic journals; they don't search for them, and don't usually take them into account. Occasionally, someone will send in a copy of, for example, JAMA, but the studies usually don't coincide with times when input is needed in the policy process. Unfortunately, the data demonstrate that the skills, authority, and infrastructures necessary to identify more rational policies are absent in some states. Prescription caps and copayments are known to reduce both appropriate and inappropriate drug utilization (Soumerai et al. 1993) . A second barrier to rational policy is scarcity o f quantitative data for evaluating policy changes. This information gap is very troubling, es pecially in the ligh t o f evidence that some policies harm vulnerable patients and shift high costs to other state and federal insurance pro grams (Soumerai et al. 1 99 1 , 1994) . By analogy, an experimental study that substantially changed the access to effective treatments o f large groups of patients without their advice or consent would be unlikely to receive approval from human subjects review committees.
Compartmentalized budgeting presents a third barrier to evidencebased policy, in that it creates incentives for controlling costs in one program while ignoring possible cost shifting to other programs or 28 S.B. Soumerai et al. agencies. As Schroeder and Cantor (1 9 9 1 ) have argued, "Although piece meal efforts at cost containment may accomplish their narrow goals, this achievement may come at the considerable price o f diminished access, decreased quality, or excessively intrusive (and even expensive) bureau cracy/' Obviously, the solution to this problem requires systemwide changes in organizational structures and incentives. Rational policy is also impeded by the lack o f any strong lobbies concerned with the impact of cost sharing. Physicians and other health professionals have been largely mute on the subject o f policy changes that affect access to care unless these changes lim it their own therapeu tic prerogatives or impact their income. Moreover, advocacy groups often become involved in only the most extreme situations, and then in a reactive, rather than a participatory, role. Previous studies (W eiss 1977 , 1978 Solomon and Shortell 1981; Brown 19 87) identified similar barriers to the use of research utiliza tion: timeliness; relevance to decision makers' goals; interpretability of communications; and organizational and political roadblocks. Our re port echoes these findings, but it also highlights the important role both o f external agencies, like the governor's office and the legislature, that often applied pressure for policy implementation with no awareness o f its potential impact, and o f federal mandates and prohibitions (e.g., O B R A '9 0 ) that resulted in compensating, crisis-oriented budget cuts.
This study, more than previous ones, highlights the fact that state drug program managers were often not unaware o f the adverse effects of poli cies; in fact, they sometimes cited research studies relevant to a policy change in response to our open-ended questions. However, as studies of clinicians' treatment practices have also shown, knowledge of the ben efits or risks is necessary, but often insufficient in itself, to cause behav ioral change (Soumerai and Lipton 1994) . Political pressures for quick Another, perhaps unavoidable, lim itation o f our study is its focus on specific cost-sharing policies w ithin the drug program and the absence o f data on how policy makers allocate increased revenues or cuts across different Medicaid budgets or between Medicaid and other governmentprovided services. W h ile important, such decisions are inherently com plex and very difficult to study. In this analysis, our focus was not on whether drug benefits should be raised or lowered, but which costcontainment policies were adopted and why. The published evidence on the economic and quality-of-care effects o f alternative drug cost-containment policies is stronger than that for many other Medicaid policies (Soumerai et al. 1993) . W e know, for example, that a one-dollar copayment is
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less likely to produce unintended cost shifting than a three-prescription cap . Similarly, we know that a carefully targeted prior authorization procedure promoting inexpensive, generic nonste roidal antiinflammatory agents (N SA ID s) in preference to brand-name alternatives can save millions of Medicaid dollars each year without increasing expenditures for other medical services (Smalley et al. 1995) . Future research and technical assistance m ight help state policy makers understand the likely risks and benefits o f other feasible policy choices in their states.
A final lim itation o f our method is the possible effect of "social desirability bias," that is, the tendency for respondents to report beliefs, opinions, and behaviors consistent with acknowledged social norms even if their actual behavior deviates from this standard. For example, it is possible that the self-reported reasons for promulgating specific costcontainment policies overemphasized concerns for patient welfare when, in fact, economic or political factors dominated decision making. While such factors undoubtedly influenced our findings in selected cases, this form o f bias is likely to be limited for the following reasons: First, six of the 11 changes in cap policies prevented, relaxed, or abolished these potentially ill-advised policies. The decisions were already congruent with research on protecting patient welfare (obviating the need for ra tionalizations). Second, when social desirability bias is a concern, indepth interviews using detailed and probing questions are more likely than brief, structured surveys to uncover underlying motivations. It is noteworthy that a ll 12 respondents in states that raised caps or copay ments acknowledged the preeminent role o f economic and budgetary concerns (over patient welfare) in that decision. Moreover, after assur ances o f anonymity, several respondents did not hesitate to provide frank and rich details regarding political obstacles to rational policy in their current administrations. Thus, we uncovered ample evidence of policy influences that are neither scientific nor altruistic. Finally, our interpre tation o f barriers to evidence-based policies was often based on events and actions, rather than opinions. For example, our conclusion regard ing the lim ited role o f policy evaluation was derived from detailed in formation on methods used and reports produced. Our interpretation that crisis-oriented budget decision making was often a barrier to ra tional policy making was based on descriptions o f the events leading up to the crisis.
A".
Recommendations
Our findings suggest several strategies to strengthen the link between research and policy. First, longer-term relations need to be established between Medicaid programs and independent research-based institu tions, such as university health policy research centers. Research centers must respond with timely information when policy makers are actively making decisions and thus are most receptive, in much the same way that opinion leader clinicians influence their colleagues' clinical deci sions during consultations at a patient's bedside (Stross and Bole 1980) . Clearly, any consultative process at the state level must be both rapid and flexible. In addition, targeted workshops can inform states about specific types o f cost-containment policies.
Responsiveness is higher if critical results are actively disseminated in a form that managers and policy makers can effectively absorb. Long and jargon-filled publications are less effective than simple, brief, and graphic communications that clearly demonstrate how research results are rel evant to actual policy choices. The perceived credibility o f policy re searchers may be as important as their results (Soumerai and Avorn 1990 ). An ideal mechanism would be for research groups to collaborate (Soumerai et al. 1991 .
